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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a sovereign immunity case. 
The facts of the accident that gave rise to this cause of action are not in dispute: 
On January 7, 2007 Mallory Martinez was returning to her home in Boise after 
completing her monthly instructional drills with the Idaho National Guard in 
Lewiston.! Ms. Martinez's trip from Lewiston to Boise is about 300 miles and takes a 
driver approximately 6 hours when conditions are good. 
On January 7,2007 weather conditions were bad.2 At approximately 12:43 p.m. 
Martinez lost control of her Ford Focus on an icy, slushy road. While going 
southbound, Martinez sideswiped one northbound vehicle and then ran into Plaintiff, 
William Teurlings. The investigating officer found the tread on Martinez's tires to be 
dangerously low: 2/32nds of an inch, 3/32nds, 4/32nds, and 9/32nds.3 
While the facts of the accident are uncontested, there are disputed issues of 
material fact regarding whether Ms. Martinez was "on duty" with the Idaho National 
Guard at the time of the accident. The Idaho Tort Claims Act grants Idaho National 
Guard members immunity from liability for claims that arise out of their activities 
"when engaged in training or duty.,,4 The trial court granted summary judgment in 
Martinez's favor because it found Martinez was "on duty" at the time she was 
traveling home from Lewiston to Boise. 
I At the time of the accident, the Defendant was named Mallory E. Larson. Since filing the suit, the 
Defendant has married, and thus, is now known as Mallory E. Martinez. Throughout this brief Defendant will 
be referred to by her current surname, Martinez. 
2 Affidavit of Ned Cannon in Partial Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue, Idaho Vehicle 
Collision Report, R. p.65. 
3Id. 
4 I.C. § 6-904 (emphasis added). 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF -3-
1. Facts Supporting Ms. Martinez's Summary Judgment Motion 
Ms. Martinez submitted the following facts in support of her summary 
judgment motion: 
• Federal law required Ms. Martinez to attend monthly instructional drills. 5 
• January 7, 2007 was the final day of one of Martinez's battalion's scheduled 
instruction drills in Lewiston. 
• According to Tony Rice's Affidavit, Ms. Martinez "was on duty from 12:00 a.m. 
on January 6, 2007 to 11:59 p.m. on January 7, 2007.,,6 
• According to Tony Rice, he "ordered" Ms. Martinez to give a fellow guardsman a 
ride from Lewiston to Boise because they both lived in Boise.7 
• Ms. Martinez's employer determined that she was "on duty" when driving home to 
Boise. After the accident, a "Line of Duty Report of Investigation" was completed, 
and the investigation concluded that Ms. Martinez was "on duty" at the time of the 
accident.s 
• Ms. Martinez's employer paid her medical bills.9 
• Ms. Martinez was wearing her National Guard uniform at the time of the accident. 
The above allegations are disputed, including the admissibility of the Affidavit 
of SSG Tony Rice. 
5 Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, ~4, R. p.l67. 
6 Id. at ~5. 
7 Id. at ~6. 
8 Report oflnvestigation, R. pp. 170-71. 
9 Af£ of SSG Tony Rice, ~7, R. p.167. 
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2. Facts in Opposition to Ms. Martinez's Summary Judgment Motion 
Mr. Teurlings submitted the following facts in support of his position that Ms. 
Martinez was not "on duty" for purposes of the Idaho Tort Claims Act at the time of 
the accident: 
• Mr. Rice, Ms. Martinez's supervisor, admits that on the day of the accident, 
Ms. Martinez "was released early from the Idaho National Guard duty station at 
Lewiston."lo Ms. Martinez was released at approximately 12:00 noon "due to a 
snow storm forecast."ll 
• Ms. Martinez was not reimbursed for her mileage for her travel to and from 
National Guard training. Mr. Rice stated that he "understood that her 
passenger, another national guardsman, helped pay for Larson's [Martinez's] 
travel expenses."l2 Ms. Martinez and the passenger she was allegedly "ordered" to 
transport split the costs of the transportation. 
• The Idaho National Guard distinguishes between "transporting personnel" and 
"commuting." According to Mr. Rice, "If an Idaho National Guard soldier, 
such as Larson [Martinez], is on active weekend duty and is transporting 
personnel or materials for or upon order of her commander(s), she would be 
provided a government vehicle, with fuel, food, and lodging. The army pays 
the guardsmen's room and board while at their duty station if they live outside 
the commuting distance of 50 miles, but commuting to and from such duty 
station is at the sole option, responsibility and expense of said commuters.,,13 
• The distance from Lewiston to Boise is over 300 miles. Of course Ms. Martinez 
was not "transporting personnel"; rather she was commuting home after being 
"reI eased earl y." 
• Mr. Rice further stated, "Although I asked Larson to provide transportation for 
her passenger, PV2 Danielle Poe, and they were released from weekend duty 
station early on January 7, 2007, it does not alter the fact that commuting to 
and from their duty station in Lewiston, was solely at these guardsmen'S 
option, responsibility, and expense."l4 
10 Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. pp. 358-59. 
11 Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex.A "Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production," R. p. 246. 
12 Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. p.359. 
13 Id. 
14 Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. pp. 358-59. 
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• Ms. Martinez's employer had no control over her commute home, and there 
were no employer imposed obligations regarding route, manner of travel, or work-
related duties. 
• Martinez was driving her own vehicle. There is nothing in the record to suggest 
that Mr. Rice approved of the car she was using, or performed any inspections 
of the car she was using on the day of the accident. There is no indication that 
her employer gave her training in how to commute home. 
• Ms. Martinez's monthly training duties did not give her full-time status; she 
maintained a civilian job as a food service worker for the Idaho Department of 
Corrections. 
• At the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was not driving between assignments. 
She was returning home after completing training. 
• Mr. Rice has submitted affidavits stating that Ms. Martinez was on duty until 
11 :59 p.m. on January 7th, but has made no mention of the hour when he 
regularly released guardsmen on scheduled training days. 
• Ms. Martinez was not "on the clock" at the time of the accident. She has stated 
that she received no compensation for commuting and is paid with a "flat fee" 
for each weekend of training. 15 
15 Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex.F "Recorded Personal Statement of Mallory Martinez," R. p.253. 
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ISSUES ON ApPEAL 
1. \Vhether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that Idaho Code § 6-
904(4) granted Ms. Martinez immunity from liability when the alleged tort 
occurred on Ms. Martinez's commute home from Idaho National Guard duty? 
2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact and found that Ms. Martinez was "acting within the 
course and scope of employment" at the time of the accident? 
3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter oflaw in its application ofIdaho's "special 
errand doctrine" to the Idaho Tort Claims Act and sovereign immunity? 
4. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Teurlings' Motion to Strike? 
5. Whether Mr. Teurlings is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court relied on two statutes when it granted Ms. Martinez immunity, 
and neither of the statutes explicitly grants Idaho National Guard members 
immunity while commuting from monthly training. 
The trial court relied on two statutes when it granted Ms. Martinez immunity 
from liability, Idaho Code § 6-904(4) and 32 U.S.C. 502. Section 6-904 states, 
[a] governmental entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal 
intent shall not be liable for any claim which: 
Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard [sic] when 
engaged in training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 
505 or 709, title 32, United States Code.!6 
Section 502(a), the statute the trial court and Ms. Martinez rely upon, states, 
(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or 
the Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each company, 
battery, squadron, and detachment of the National Guard, unless 
excused by the Secretary concerned, shall-
(1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target 
practice, at least 48 times each year; and 
(2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, outdoor 
target practice, or other exercises, at least 15 days each year. 
According to the trial court, though neither of these statutes explicitly mentions 
commuting to and from work, Ms. Martinez's trip home from Lewiston to Boise 
"arose out of' her National Guard duty.!7 
16 Emphasis added. 
17 Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Swift Transportation 
Company's Motion to Intervene, R. pp. 332-33 
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Teurlings' argument before the trial court and now before this Court is that the 
Idaho Legislature did not explicitly include travel. Instead, the Legislature stated that 
government employees, "while acting within the course and scope o/their 
employment" are not liable for any claim which "[a]rises out of the activities of the 
Idaho National Guard when engaged in training or duty.,,18 In this case, Plaintiffs 
claim arises out of Ms. Martinez's negligent driving on Idaho's public roads after she 
had completed her training and duty-this case does not arise out of Ms. Martinez's 
actions as an employee of the National Guard. 
Section 6-904(4) explicitly cites Tile 32 of the United States Code, sections 
316,502,503,504,505 or 709. While these sections mention many activities that are 
considered "training and duty," the United States Congress did not see fit to include 
"commuting" as part of a guardsman's "training and duty." 
Because Title 32 lacked any mention of commuting to and from training, the 
trial court relied on Title 38 of the United States Code. 19 Use of Title 38 is legal error 
when used to interpret the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Title 38 is not mentioned within 
Section 6-904(4); Title 38 deals with "Veteran's Benefits." The definitions section 
specifically cited by the trial court explicitly limits the definitions to Title 38. It 
begins, "[f]or purposes of this title.,,2o The definition cited by the trial court does not 
support Ms. Martinez's position. 
18 Emphasis added. 
19 Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Swift Transportation 
Company's Motion to Intervene, R. pp. 332-33 
20 38 U.S.c. 101; emphasis added. 
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Indeed, Title 38 supports Plaintiff's position. The fact that "travel" to and from 
National Guard training is entirely absent from Title 32, but is referenced in Title 38, 
indicates that the United States Congress is capable of including "travel" when it is so 
inclined. 
Mr. Rice stated in his affidavit that Ms. Martinez was only dismissed and 
allowed to leave Lewiston after she had "completed" her dril1.21 At the time of the 
accident, Ms. Martinez had completed all activities listed under 32 U.S.C.A. 502(a). 
Ms. Martinez has provided no authority in support of the position that either the Idaho 
Legislature or the United States congress intended to exempt National Guard members 
from liability for accidents they may cause traveling to or from their training. It is 
undisputed that neither the Idaho Legislature nor the United States Congress explicitly 
granted immunity to national guardsmen when traveling to or from work on Idaho's 
public roads. 
2. Section 6-904 requires that a government employee be "acting within the 
course and scope of [her] employment or duties" in order for sovereign 
immunity to apply. 
Idaho Code section 6-904 (4) provides that a "governmental entity and its 
employees while acting within the course and scope o/their employment and without 
malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which ... [a]rises out of the 
activities of the Idaho national guard when engaged in training or duty under sections 
21 Affidavit of Tony Rice, ~ 6, R. p.167. 
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316,502, 503,504,505 or 709, title 32, United States Code."22 Accordingly, the 
applicability of these statutes turns on whether Ms. Martinez was "acting within the 
course and scope" of her employment with the National Guard at the time of the 
accident. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has not had an occasion to interpret or discuss the 
applicability of I.C. § 6-904(4). The Court's discussions regarding the meaning of the 
phrase "course and scope of employment" have generally arisen in two contexts: (l) 
employer liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (2) and worker's 
compensation cases. In defining the scope of employment in a tort case, the doctrine 
of respondeat superior is considered the appropriate standard to be applied. The 
concepts discussed in worker's compensation cases may be instructive, but are not 
controlling. The Arizona Court of Appeals discussed the relationship between these 
two areas of law in Robarge v. Bechtel Power Corp., 640 P.2d 211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982): 
The line separating workmen's compensation cases from tort law cases is 
indistinct, for tort cases have cited workmen's compensation cases as 
precedential authority, in addition to using similar language when addressing 
situations common to both and, particularly, when the "going and coming" rule 
is at issue. Nevertheless, the rules adopted for workmen's compensation cases 
should not be mechanically applied in negligence cases. 
640 P.2d at 213 (citations omitted). The Robarge court cited the policy reasons for 
this distinction as follows: 
While workmen's compensation law and respondeat superior doctrine 
both involve allocations of costs regarding industrial accidents, they 
differ in scope. Workmen's compensation benefits tum solely upon 
22 Emphasis added. 
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whether the employee was injured while performing an activity related 
to his job-and "relatedness" is usually a function of benefit to the 
employer. In contrast, respondeat superior subjects employers to 
liability for injuries suffered by an indefinite number of third persons. 
To limit this burden of liability, the narrower concept, "scope of 
employment," has long been tied to the employer's right to control the 
employee's activity at the time of his tortious conduct. 
640 P.2d at 213, quoting Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761, 764 
(Alaska 1973). 
The doctrine of respondeat superior provides that an employer is responsible 
for the torts of its employee when the torts are committed wi thin the scope of 
employment. Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 80, 83-84, 14 P.3d 
1074, 1077-78 (Ct. App. 2000), quoting Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 
123 Idaho 937,944, 854 P.2d 280,287 (Ct. App. 1993). In general, the employee's 
conduct "is within the scope of his employment if it is of the kind which he is 
employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and 
space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." Podolan, 123 
Idaho at 944, 854 P.2d at 287 (citations omitted). 
In Idaho, the test for whether an employee was acting within the scope of his 
employment when he committed a tort is "the right to control reserved by the 
employer over the functions and duties of the agent." Id. at 945, 854 P .2d at 288 
(citations omitted). Generally, the issue "is a factual question to be decided by the 
trier of fact. However, conduct that is clearly outside the scope of employment may 
properly be decided by the court as a matter of law." Id, citing Birkner v. Salt Lake 
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County, 771 P.2d 1053,1057 (Utah 1989) and Manion v. Waybright, 59 Idaho 
643,656,86 P.2d 181,186 (1938). 
This doctrine was recently discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Finholt v. 
Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,155 P.3d 695 (2007). In Finholt, the plaintiff was injured in an 
automobile accident involving Jacob Albrethsen, who worked as a salesman for 
Fairway Lawns, a company owned by the defendant. Albrethsen worked a split-shift 
of mornings and early evenings, and Fairway required that Albrethsen provide his own 
vehicle, although the company reimbursed him for the cost of traveling to job sites. Id 
at 896, 155 P.3d 697. At the time of the accident, Albrethsen had completed his 
morning assignments and was on his way to meet his girlfriend for lunch. Id. 
The defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that Albrethsen was not 
acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The 
plaintiff argued that Albrethsen's actions fell under a "special errand" or "traveling 
employee" exception. Id. 143 Idaho at 897, 155 P.3d at 698. The court noted that 
generally, "work performed to serve the employer falls within the course and scope of 
employment, whereas actions pursued for a purely personal purpose do not." Id., citing 
Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 184,983 P.2d 834, 838 (1999). 
Pursuant to the "coming and going" rule articulated by Idaho courts, an 
employee is not acting within the course and scope of his employment while he is on 
his way to and from work.23 143 Idaho at 898, 155 P.3d at 699, citing Ridgway v. 
23 The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated that the "coming and going" rule from worker's compensation law 
may be applied in negligence actions brought against employers based on the theory of respondeat superior. 
Caseyv. Sevy, 129 Idaho, 13, 17,921 P.2d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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Combined Ins. Companies of America, 98 Idaho 410,411,565 P .2d 1367, 1368 (1977). 
The "special errand" exception to this rule, which typically arises in worker's 
compensation cases, provides that an employee who leaves his normal place of work 
to perform some special service or errand at the direction of his employer is 
considered to be acting within the course and scope of his employment. 143 Idaho at 
898, 155 P.3d at 699 (citations omitted).24 The Finholt court concluded that the 
special errand exception did not apply to the facts of the case. 
Next, the court discussed the "traveling employee" exception to the coming and 
going rule, in which an employee is typically covered by worker's compensation when 
the "employee's work requires him to travel away from the employer's place of 
business or his normal place of work." 143 Idaho at 898, 155 P.3d at 699, quoting 
Cheung v. Wasatch Electric, 136 Idaho 895, 897, 42 P.3d 688, 690 (2002). Noting 
that the traveling employee theory had not previously been applied "outside the 
worker's compensation context where it expands employer liability," the Court stated, 
"Regardless, we need not reach the question of whether to apply the traveling 
employee exception to tort claims, because the theory would not apply to the facts 
presented by this case." 143 Idaho at 898, 155 P.3d at 699. 
Even if this Court were to apply worker's compensation theories, for the 
following reasons, the Defendant has failed to establish that she was acting within the 
24 A form of this exception was considered by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Casey v. Sery, although it was 
not specifically designed as such. In Casey, the plaintiffs asserted that the incident fell under an exception to 
the coming and going rule, because the employee was traveling from his employer's premises "for a 
specified task as directed by his employer." 129 Idaho at 18,921 P.2d at 195. Without discussing whether 
the exception should be applied in tort cases, the court stated that it was ultimately unpersuaded by the 
plaintiffs' theories regarding why the coming and going rule was inapplicable to the case. Id. At 19,921 
P.2d at 196. 
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course and scope of her employment with the National Guard at the time of the 
accident. First, Ms. Martinez acknowledges that at the time of the accident, she had 
already been released from her training duties. On the weekend of the accident, Ms. 
Martinez had been "participating in her monthly training commitment to the Idaho 
National Guard" in Lewiston, Idaho. However, at "approximately 12:00 noon on 
January 7, 2007, the guard members were released/rom training due to a snow storm 
forecast. ,,25 Ms. Martinez's destination at the time of the accident was her home in 
Nampa, Idaho. She was driving her own vehicle. It is clear that at the time of the 
accident, Ms. Martinez had completed her work duties and was simply returning 
home. Under the "coming and going" rule, Ms. Martinez was not acting within the 
course and scope of her employment while she was on her way home from work. 
Neither does the "traveling employee" exception apply. Again, this exception 
has been previously limited to worker's compensation cases. The Idaho Supreme 
Court clarified the "traveling employee" exception in Andrews v. Les Bois Masonry, 
Inc., 127 Idaho 65, 896 P.2d 973 (1995), a worker's compensation case, as follows: 
"When an employee's work requires the employee to travel away from the employer's 
place of business or the employee's normal place of work, the employee will be held to 
be within the course and scope of employment continuously during the trip, except 
when a distinct departure for personal business occurs." Id. at 67,896 P.2d at 975. 
In this case, Ms. Martinez was not traveling away from her normal place of 
work to engage in more work for the National Guard at a different job site, nor was 
25 Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex.A "Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production," R. p. 246 (emphasis added). 
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she transferring from one training station to another. She had concluded her work and 
was simply returning home; therefore, the traveling employee exception should not 
apply. 
Further, although the traveling employee doctrine does not require that the 
employee receive travel expenses, "the payment of travel expenses, along with other 
evidence indicating the employer intended to compensate the employee for travel time, 
will justify expanding the course of employment to include going to and from work." 
Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 110 Idaho 871, 872, 719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986), 
quoting Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 105 Idaho 108,666 P.2d 635 (1983) 
(Barker I); Andrews, 127 Idaho at 67,896, P.2d at 975. Ms. Martinez acknowledges 
that the National Guard does not reimburse her for travel expenses associated with 
attending weekend trainings: 
Q. All right, now when you're on guard duty uh, traveling back and forth, 
is, are the travel expenses paid by the National Guard or are they paid out of 
your own pocket? 
A. They're paid out of my own pocket. 
Q. Are you reimbursed by the Guard? 
A. No.26 
Again, while the travel expenses issue is not decisive, the fact that Ms. Martinez's 
expenses were not paid by the National Guard is strongly suggestive that Ms. 
Martinez's travel was not within the course of her employment with the National 
Guard. 
26 Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex.F "Recorded Personal Statement of MaIIory Martinez," R. p.253. 
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Neither does the "special errand" exception apply in this case because Ms. 
Martinez was providing transportation for another employee, Danielle Poe: 
Q. Okay, let's see now uh, when you and her were getting ready to go to do 
Guard duty uh, did she, does she ask you if she can ride with you or do you a 
.. , just volunteer to take her or how do you make that arrangement? 
A. Uh, it was, okay at that time I had been asked by my commander and 
my uh, section sargent [sic] to provide transportation for her. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then it just kind a ended up that we would prearrange our you 
know, when we t. .. when I'd pick her up and where I'd drop her off and all 
that so ... 
A. So they requested that you give her transportation on this particular uh . 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, now have they requested that before? 
Uh 27 A. ,yes. 
Ms. Martinez argues that providing transportation for Ms. Poe for the weekend was 
part of Ms. Martinez's job. However, it should be remembered that Ms. Martinez was 
expected to travel to Boise for training anyway, and that she was not being reimbursed 
for her travel expenses. Also, Ms. Martinez was not being reimbursed for travel 
expenses associated with providing a ride for Ms. Poe, as the two shared fuel expenses 
during the trip. While Ms. Martinez may have been asked to give Ms. Poe a ride for 
the sake of convenience, it does not appear that providing transportation was 
considered a part of Ms. Martinez's job duties for the National Guard, either generally 
or on this occasion specifically. Apparently Ms. Poe was also required to travel to 
Lewiston for weekend training at her own expense, and Ms. Martinez merely 
facilitated this trip. Both Ms. Martinez and Ms. Poe benefited from this arrangement, 
as each spent less for fuel than if they had traveled separately. The fact that Ms. 
27 Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex.F "Recorded Personal Statement of Mallory Martinez," R. p.253. 
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Martinez provided a ride for Ms. Poe does not mean that Ms. Martinez's act of 
returning home to Nampa after being released from training duty in Lewiston 
amounted to a special errand for her employer. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions in cases 
involving automobile accidents in which national guardsmen were traveling in their 
own vehicles. In State v. Superior Court, 524 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1974), the Arizona 
Supreme Court considered whether the state of Arizona could be held liable under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligent acts of an Arizona National 
Guardsman who was involved in an automobile accident while traveling to a weekend 
training session. The guardsman, who was driving his own vehicle, was killed in the 
accident, as were the occupants of the other vehicle. In determining whether the 
guardsman was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, the 
court concluded that no exception to the "going and coming" rule applied under the 
facts of the case: 
Going to work is certainly preparatory to working. But, such travel is 
not within the scope of the employment unless the employee is 
rendering a service growing out of or incidental to the employment. 
Driving his car to Phoenix was not part of Derrick's training. He was not 
required to run any errands for the Academy before his 6:30 a.m. 
arrival. While the Arizona National Guard granted travel 
reimbursements, we can find no authority that would give the Guard a 
legal right to control Derrick before the time that he was ordered to 
report for duty, such as during his travel from San Manuel to Phoenix or 
travel back home, again. 
524 P .2d at 954. The court also noted that whereas employer liability under the 
doctrine of repondeat superior generally depends upon the employer's right to control 
the employee's conduct, such control was lacking in this case: "The Guard had no 
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right to dictate the manner of travel, the route to be taken, his speed, or that he use his 
car to go and come from school as compared to other modes of travel." Id. Further, 
the payment of a travel allowance, without more, did not subject the guardsman to the 
control of the Guard while he was traveling. Finally, although the respondents argued 
that the guardsman was on "'full time training duty' throughout the six-months period 
of attendance at the monthly school meetings in Phoenix," the court found that the 
record did not support this contention. The guardsman had a full-time civilian job, and 
his orders only required him to report for full-time training duty for a period of two 
days each month: "Derrick's once-a-month sessions at the Arizona Academy certainly 
did not give him 'full time' status in the Arizona National Guard for six months while 
at the same time he worked six days a week for Magma Copper Company." Id. at 955. 
The facts of the present case are similar to those in State v. Superior Court. 
Ms. Martinez was driving her own vehicle home after completing her monthly training 
duty. The Guard did not dictate Ms. Martinez's manner of travel, the route to be 
taken, her speed, or her mode of transportation. Ms. Martinez was not even reimbursed 
for travel expenses, unlike the guardsman in State v. Superior Court. Finally, her 
monthly training duties did not give her full-time status, especially since she 
maintained a civilian job as a food service worker for the Idaho Department of 
Corrections.28 As in State v. Superior Court, the employer control necessary for 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is lacking here. See also Robarge, 
640 P.2d at 214 (employee driving home at end of workday was not within the scope 
28 Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex.F "Recorded Personal Statement of Mallory Martinez," R. p.253. 
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of employment because he was traveling in his own vehicle and without employer 
imposed obligations regarding route, manner of travel, or work-related duties). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a similar factual situation in 
Hartzell v. United States, 786 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the United States was 
held not liable for injuries resulting from an automobile accident involving an Air 
Force staff sergeant. At the time of the accident, the staff sergeant had just completed 
a temporary duty assignment at Camp Mercury in Nevada and was driving her own 
vehicle back to her permanent duty station at Kirtland Air Force Base, near 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. She had also requested one additional day of leave so that 
she could do some sight-seeing on her way back to Kirtland. 
Applying Arizona law, the Court stated, 
[A]n employee is considered to be acting within the scope of employment if he 
meets either of two related tests. The first, adopted from section 228 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, states that the act of an employee is within 
the scope of employment only if: (1) it is typical of the kind of work the 
employee was hired to perform; (2) it occurs within the authorized time and 
space limits; and (3) it was intended at least in part to serve the master. The 
second holds an employer liable for the negligence of an employee if, at the 
time of the accident, the employee is: (1) subject to the employer's control or 
right to control; and (2) acting in furtherance of the employer's business. 
786 F.2d at 966 (citations omitted). The Court found that neither of these tests was 
satisfied under the factual circumstances of the case. As to the first test, the staff 
sergeant was an administrative specialist; driving her own vehicle for personal reasons 
was not an act typical of the work she was hired to perform. Also, because the 
accident occurred while she was on leave, it did not occur within the authorized time 
and space of her employment. Further, although the staff sergeant's travel from a 
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temporary duty station back to her permanent duty station "was in some part intended 
to serve the Air Force, this factor alone is not sufficient to bring her within the scope 
of employment." Id. at 966-67. As to the control test, the Court noted that the Air 
Force did not have the right to control the staff sergeant's route and manner of travel, 
nor did it request that she perform any service related duties en route back to her base. 
Id. at 967. Additionally, the staff sergeant was on leave at the time of the accident; 
the Air Force's only interest in her during this period was that she report back to 
Kirtland on time. Id. See also Wuorinen v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 201 
N.W.2d 521 (Wis. 1972) (state was not liable for injuries caused by national 
guardsman's negligent operation of his vehicle where guardsman was on 24-hour leave 
and the National Guard did not control his conduct at the time of the accident or the 
method or route of travel in his private vehicle). 
In the present case, if this Court applied the test set forth in Hartzell, the result 
would be the same. As to the first test, driving her own vehicle was not typical of the 
kind of work Ms. Martinez was hired to perform for the National Guard. Also, 
because Ms. Martinez had completed her training duties for the weekend and was 
released to return home, the accident did not occur within the authorized time and 
space limits of her employment. Further, although it could be argued that providing 
transportation for Ms. Poe was intended at least in part to serve Ms. Martinez's 
employer, this factor alone is not sufficient to bring Ms. Martinez within the scope of 
employment. In Hartzell, the fact that the staff sergeant was traveling from one duty 
station to another was not sufficient. In this case, Ms. Martinez was not even traveling 
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from one duty assignment to another, or from one job site to another. She had been 
released from work and was simply returning home. 
As to the second test, the National Guard had no right to control Ms. Martinez's 
actions after she was released from training duty. It has been noted that "the right to 
control has long been the touchstone in determining whether one was acting within the 
scope of his employment." Wuorinen, 201 N.W.2d at 526. In Wuorinen v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., another case involving an off-duty national guardsman who had 
an accident while driving his own vehicle, the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that 
the "right of control" is material to determine whether Semenok was acting 
within the scope of his employment. We believe the answer is clear. One 
authorized to leave on pass to do what he wants on his own free time for a 
period of 24 hours is not acting within the scope of his military duty nor in 
pursuance thereof. The national guard was in no way controlling Semenok's 
free time, and the national guard did not control Semenok's conduct at these 
material times, nor the method or route of travel in his private vehicle. 
Id. Similarly, the National Guard did not control Ms. Martinez's conduct at the time 
of the accident. She was free to take any route on her return trip home. She could 
sight-see if she wanted to, could stop for meals or to rest; she could make the trip in 
one day, or take several days to return home if she chose. This complete freedom of 
action further emphasizes the conclusion that Ms. Martinez was not acting within the 
course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. 
It should be noted that the plaintiffs in Hartzell also argued for application of 
the "dual purpose" rule, which provides that "an employee is acting within the scope 
of his employment if he is going to or coming from the job site and service to the 
employer is at least a concurrent cause of his trip." 786 F.2d at 970 (citations 
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omitted). However, the Court noted that the dual purpose rule is a worker's 
compensation concept that had only been applied to the respondeat superior setting 
once by an Arizona court, and that Arizona courts since then had refused to extend the 
rule beyond the facts of that case. The court reiterated that in Arizona, the doctrine of 
respondeat superior is the standard against which a determination of scope of 
employment should be made in a tort case, and that concepts borrowed from worker's 
compensation law are not controlling in tort cases. Id. (citations omitted). See also 
Wuorinen, 201 N.W.2d 521 ("This is not a workmen's compensation case so neither 
the broader test of employment nor the dual purpose doctrine are controlling. Rather, 
the principles of the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior apply."). 
In this case, Ms. Martinez has failed to establish that her return trip from 
training in Lewiston to her home was within the scope of her employment for purposes 
of Idaho Code § 6-904(4). At the very least, whether Ms. Martinez was acting within 
the course and scope of her employment is a question for the jury. 
3. Summary judgment was premature because there are genuine, material issues 
of fact as to whether Ms. Martinez was acting within the "course and scope" of 
her employment at the time of the accident. 
The trial court stated in its Memorandum Opinion that "[b lased upon the 
undisputed facts of this case, Martinez was on duty until 11 :59 p.m., and following 
orders of a superior by providing transportation to a fellow guardsman. ,,29 The trial 
court reasoned, "While the Plaintiff suggests that the Defendant was simply traveling 
29 Memorandum Opinion, R. p.333. 
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on her own, and had been dismissed from drills so that she was no longer on duty, 
these claims are speculative and not supported by affidavit. ,,30 Plaintiff respectfully 
disagrees with the trial court's interpretation of the record. 
Ms. Martinez's self-serving claim that she was "on duty" until 11 :59 p.m. is 
rebutted by the fact that she was returning to her home after training had completed. It 
is not unusual for employees to work regular schedules, but for those employees to be 
dismissed early-particularly in order for employees to travel home early due to poor 
weather conditions. Ms. Martinez claims that she was "ordered" by a superior to give 
a ride to a fellow guardsman. The facts of this case show that the "order" was nothing 
more than carpooling for the sake of convenience. 
The Idaho National Guard distinguishes between "transporting personnel" and 
"commuting." According to Mr. Rice, 
If an Idaho National Guard soldier, such as Larson [Martinez], is on 
active weekend duty and is transporting personnel or materials for or 
upon order of her commander(s), she would be provided a government 
vehicle, with fuel, food, and lodging. The army pays the guardsmen's 
room and board while at their duty station if they live outside the 
commuting distance of 50 miles, but commuting to and from such duty 
station is at the sole option, responsibility and expense of said 
commuters.31 
Mr. Rice further stated, 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
Although I asked Larson [Martinez] to provide transportation for her 
passenger, PV2 Danielle Poe, and they were released from weekend 
duty station early on January 7,2007, it does not alter the fact that 
commuting to and from their duty station in Lewiston, was solely at 
these guardsmen's option, responsibility, and expense.32 
32 Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. pp. 358-59. 
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Whether Ms. Martinez was acting within the "course and scope" of her employment is 
a factual determination for the jury, at the very least. 
4. The Idaho legislature has not included the special-errand doctrine as a 
condition to apply sovereign immunity. 
The trial court ruled "in the alternative" that Ms. Martinez was acting on a 
"special errand.,,33 Section 6-904(4) fails to mention the special-errand exception cited 
by the trial court. Section 6-904(4) explicitly lists the activities Martinez could engage 
in and be exempt from liability (training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 
505 or 709, title 32, United States Code). Had the Idaho legislature intended to exempt 
from liability all National Guard members while traveling on the Idaho public roads, 
the legislature would have certainly included such explicit language. 
Neither has Ms. Martinez cited any cases in Idaho where the special-errand 
doctrine has been applied in an action other than workers' compensation. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines the "special-errand doctrine" as follows: "The principle that an 
employee will be covered by workers' compensation for injuries occurring while the 
employee is on a journey or special duty for the employer aw from the workplace.,,34 
In its opinion, this Court cited Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695 
(2007). Finholt was a tort action. In Finholt the Idaho Supreme Court noted the 
special-errand doctrine, but did not find that it applied under the facts of the case. 
33 Memorandum Opinion, R. pp. 335-37. 
34 Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition. 
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In this case, Ms. Martinez seeks to use the special-errand doctrine in the 
context of sovereign immunity; yet, Ms. Martinez has failed to cite any authority in 
support of the position that the special-errand doctrine extends to provide sovereign 
immunity for state employees when they return home from work. 
The trial court analogized this case to the Colorado Court of Appeals case 
Colorado Civil Air Patrol v. Hagans, 662 P.2d 194, 196 (Colo. App., 1983). The 
Colorado case cited by the Court is a workers' compensation case. The Colorado court 
reasoned, "Among such special circumstances is the exception that an employer may 
agree, expressly or impliedly, that the employment relation shall continue during the 
period of coming and going." The Colorado Court continued, "Thus, when a claimant, 
at the time of his injury, is performing a duty with which he is charged as a part of his 
contract for service, or under the express or implied direction of his employer, he is 
within the course of his employment under the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. 
This reasoning collapses outside of the context of workers' compensation. 
According to the Colorado court, an employer cannot escape liability to its employee 
when the employer has agreed that certain actions fall within the employment relation. 
In short, it is reasonable for the special-errand doctrine to apply in the context of 
workers' compensation. 
This is not such a case. In this case, Mr. Teurlings was struck by Ms. 
Martinez's vehicle on an Idaho public road. Mr. Teurlings had absolutely no notice 
that Ms. Martinez's supervisor told her to carpool with another guardsman. In this 
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case, Mr. Teurlings was not a party to any agreement between Ms. Martinez and her 
employer. It is legal error to apply workers' compensation law to the facts of this case. 
5. The trial court erroneously admitted affiant legal conclusions and gave undue 
weight to Mr. Rice's opinion that Ms. Martinez was "on duty" at the time of 
the accident. 
Ms. Martinez submitted affidavits in support of summary judgment where the 
affiants asserted that Ms. Martinez was "on duty" at the time of the accident. Mr. 
Teurlings filed a Motion to Strike these assertions because of the inherent confusion 
between the affiants' testimony and the legal question before the trial court. That is, 
before the trial court was the legal issue of whether Ms. Martinez was "on duty" as the 
term is used in Idaho Code § 6-904. However, each of the affiants was testifying that 
Ms. Martinez was "on duty" for purposes of various Idaho National Guard protocol. 35 
Mr. Teurlings sought to strike the affiants' statements because the statements were 
submitted as legal conclusions when the affiants were in no position to offer opinions 
on the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The trial court denied Teurlings' Motion to Strike in a 
footnote and then went on to use the affiants' legal assertions in support of the court's 
concl usion. 36 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, 
Legal conclusions are inadmissible because the jury would have no way 
of knowing whether the preparer of the report was cognizant of the 
35 R. pp.l70-71. 
36 Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Swift Transportation 
Company's Motion to Intervene, R. pA. 
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requirements underlying the legal conclusion and, if not, whether the 
preparer might have a higher or lower standard than the law requires. 
Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, Inc., 886 F.2d 299,303 (lIth Cir., 1989). The Ninth 
Circuit has analyzed the Hines decision and has reached a similar conclusion. 
Pure legal conclusions are not admissible as factual findings. In the 
context of a summary judgment motion, a conclusion of law by a third-
party investigator does not, by itself, create a genuine issue of material 
fact for the obvious reason that a legal conclusion is not a factual 
statement and for the reasons explained by the Eleventh Circuit. 
Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770,777 (C.A.9, 2010). 
Martinez's Affidavit Paragraph 6 states in pertinent part as follows: 
At the time of the accident on January 7, 2007, I was on duty with the 
Idaho National Guard and was acting under my superior's orders by 
transporting a fellow guardsman to Boise, Idaho. 
Whether Ms. Martinez was "on duty" for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-904 is a matter 
of law. It is impermissible for Ms. Martinez to offer a legal opinion on the issue in her 
affidavit. 
Mr. Rice draws similar conclusions. His affidavit at Paragraphs 5 and 7 states 
in pertinent part, 
SPC Larson [Martinez] was on duty from 12:00 a.m. on January 6, 2007 
to 11:59 p.m. on January 7, 2007. 
SPC Larson [Martinez] notified me of the accident after it occurred. A 
line of Duty Report of Investigation was completed. The result of the 
investigation determined that SPC Larson [Martinez] was on duty at the 
time of the accident and her medical bills were paid as a result of that 
determination. 
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Again, whether Ms. Martinez was "on duty" for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-904 is a 
matter oflaw. Mr. Teurlings on appeal requests this Court to reverse the trial court's 
finding, and rule that Ms. Martinez and Mr. Rice drew inadmissible legal conclusions. 
6. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal 
Should the Court rule in Mr. Teurlings' favor, Mr. Teurlings petitions this 
Court for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal under I.C. § 12-121 and Rule 
54. An award of attorney fees is appropriate on appeal under I.C. § 12-121 when the 
appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 652, 39 P.3d 588, 592 (2001). 
CONCLUSION 
It is unprecedented for a government employee to be immune from liability for 
torts committed during her regular commute, on public roads, at her own expense, in 
her own vehicle, and completely at her own disposal. In accordance with the above, 
Mr. Teurlings petitions this Court to reverse the trial court's entry of summary 
judgment and find that Ms. Martinez was not entitled to immunity while commuting 
home pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904. 
In the alternative, Mr. Teurlings respectfully petitions the Court to find that 
there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Ms. Martinez was acting within 
the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. 
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